



Security Council

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GENERAL

S/26570
12 October 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 12 OCTOBER 1993 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The members of the Security Council have considered your report of 7 October (S/26546) concerning the request from the Royal Government of Cambodia contained in its letter to you dated 26 September 1993.

The members of the Council agree in principle with your recommendation to establish in Phnom Penh a team of 20 military liaison officers, contributed by Governments, for a single period of six months. They invite you to submit as soon as possible a further report setting out in greater detail the proposed objectives, and terms of reference of such a team, together with detailed plans for its dispatch and an estimate of the resources required.

The members of the Council also invite you to consider, and address the implications of, the possibility of incorporating the officers in the United Nations office you plan to establish in Cambodia, as was suggested in the letter from the Royal Government of Cambodia.

(Signed) Ronaldo Mota SARDENBERG
President of the Security Council



Security Council

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S/26571
12 October 1993

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NOTE BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Security Council a report submitted by the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b) (i) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991).

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Annex

Letter dated 11 October 1993 from the Executive Chairman of
the Special Commission addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a report signed in Baghdad on 8 October 1993 by representatives of Iraq, the Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The report is the outcome of talks held from 2 to 8 October 1993 with the highest levels of the Government of Iraq.

These latest talks were a follow-up to those held in Baghdad from 15 to 19 July 1993 between the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr. Tariq Aziz, and the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission (S/26127) and to high-level technical talks held in New York from 31 August to 10 September 1993 between, on the one hand, representatives of the Special Commission and IAEA and, on the other, representatives of Iraq (S/26451).

The enclosed report on the most recent round of talks contains three sections. Section I was prepared in the course of discussions between the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission and the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq and section II in discussions between the Deputy Prime Minister and the IAEA Action Team Leader who had been designated as his personal representative by the Director General of the Agency. Section III contains the decision to resume further talks between Iraq and the Special Commission in New York in mid-November 1993.

I would be most grateful if the present letter and its enclosure could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Rolf EKEUS
Executive Chairman

Appendix

Report on the high-level talks held in Baghdad
from 2 to 8 October 1993

INTRODUCTION

1. In July 1993 the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission visited Baghdad, in the course of which he met the highest levels of the Iraqi Government (S/26127). A follow-up to these meetings, in the form of high-level technical talks, in which the Special Commission, IAEA and Iraqi representatives participated, took place in New York from 31 August to 10 September 1993 (S/26451). Based on the outcome of these talks, technical experts from the Special Commission arrived in Baghdad on 27 September 1993 in order to receive data identified in New York as remaining to be provided and promised by Iraq and, on 1 October 1993, the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission arrived in Baghdad to continue the talks at the highest level. These talks commenced on 2 October, with the participation of representatives of IAEA, and ended on 8 October 1993. During this period, a number of plenary meetings were held, as well as private meetings between the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq, Mr. Tariq Aziz, and the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission and separately with the IAEA Action Team Leader, and between the Director of the Iraqi Military Industrialization Corporation, General Amer M. Rasheed, and the Executive Chairman and separately with the action Team Leader. The list of the delegations to the talks will be found in attachment I.

2. The delegations participating in the talks agreed that they should resume where the previous talks had ended. In that respect, the Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq reaffirmed the position of Iraq on all the issues in the paper which he had provided to the Executive Chairman in July (S/26127), and the Executive Chairman reaffirmed the statements made and undertakings given in his position paper delivered in July (S/26127) and in the report on the high-level technical talks in New York in September.

3. The present report summarizes the proceedings of the most recent talks and records the progress made. Section I deals with the ballistic, biological and chemical aspects and section II the nuclear aspects.

I. BALLISTIC, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL ASPECTS

A. Outstanding issues

4. It was understood in the New York talks that, when Iraq addressed in a satisfactory manner the issues referred to in annex I to the report of those talks and information provided by it was independently verified where necessary, the Commission and IAEA would be in a position to conclude that Iraq had completed the actions necessary to bring it into compliance with paragraphs 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991).

5. The Commission considers that, in the course of the current Baghdad session, considerable and substantial progress has been made in the provision of

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information by Iraq in the chemical, biological and ballistic missile areas of its programmes proscribed by Security Council resolution 687 (1991). Gaps identified during the high-level technical talks in New York have substantially been filled. Iraq has explained that much of the documentation concerning those programmes has been destroyed and hence it is unable to provide certain details required by the Commission and IAEA. However, this does not detract from the conclusion of the Commission indicated above.

6. With the provision by Iraq of the necessary information on critical foreign suppliers as defined in annex I to document S/26451 (see attachment II) and upon its verification as necessary, the Commission can conclude as follows:

(a) In the light of the totality of the information available to the Commission in the ballistic and biological areas, Iraq has fully discharged its obligations to provide information in relation to its past activities in these areas. The Commission and the competent Iraqi officials will follow up on details, if any, of the supplementary information provided in Baghdad, when the Commission deems further clarification necessary. The Commission, therefore, could state that Iraq has discharged its obligation, in compliance with paragraphs 8 and 9 (a) of Security Council resolution 687 (1991), to provide the information necessary to constitute full, final and complete disclosures of its past proscribed programmes in these areas;

(b) That the substantial supplementary information provided by Iraq in Baghdad on the chemical area covered the full process of chemical weapons production, namely the quantities of precursors imported, the quantities of agent produced, the quantities, types and capacities of equipment acquired for agent production, the quantities of chemical munitions produced or imported and the quantities of munitions filled, by agent. It was explained, in a manner satisfactory to the Commission, that, with the exception of the quantity of agents, munitions and production equipment seen and destroyed by the Commission's inspection teams, all the chemical assets had been either destroyed or otherwise disposed of. The information provided would be used by the Commission solely for the purposes of resolution 687 (1991). The initial assessment of the Commission's experts in Baghdad was that those data provided a credible account of Iraq's chemical weapons programme and its disposal and no further questions arose at the present stage. However, the experts needed to return to the Commission's headquarters in New York in order to verify, assess and confirm the numbers and the additional information that had been provided. The Commission would use its best endeavours to present its final assessment of the supplementary data within a two-week period, or as shortly as possible thereafter. The Commission hopes that that assessment would enable it, in the chemical area, to make the same determination as it has done above in relation to the ballistic and biological areas.

B. Ongoing monitoring and verification

(a) Resolution 715 (1991)

7. During the talks, the Iraqi side expressed its position as follows:

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(a) The information, declarations and answers previously presented by Iraq during the years 1991, 1992, 1993 and during the high-level technical talks that were held in New York from 31 August to 10 September 1993, as well as in the second round of the talks that were held in Baghdad before and during Ambassador Rolf Ekéus' visit from 2 to 8 October 1993 and the actions it had undertaken during such period represent a full and complete implementation of Iraq's obligations under paragraphs 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13 of resolution 687 (1991);

(b) Iraq deeply believes that, by implementing its obligations under section C of resolution 687 (1991) and in particular paragraphs 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13 in the manner mentioned in subparagraph (a) above, and by Iraq's formal acceptance (at the appropriate time) of the plans for ongoing monitoring approved by the Council in resolution 715 (1991) as agreed upon between Iraq and the Special Commission and IAEA as well as its formal acceptance of the initiation of the implementation of the plans by the Special Commission and IAEA, the Security Council should consider it sufficient to take the decision on the immediate implementation of paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991) without any obstructions, restrictions or additional conditions;

(c) Iraq is ready to declare its formal acceptance of the plans for ongoing monitoring in accordance with resolution 715 (1991) and the implementation thereof when it becomes clear to it that the obligations of the Security Council vis-à-vis Iraq under the Security Council resolutions and especially paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991) would be implemented fully without obstructions, restrictions or additional conditions;

(d) After the initiation of the implementation of the plans for ongoing monitoring and in the light of the implementation by the Security Council of its obligations vis-à-vis Iraq in accordance with the resolutions of the Council, and especially paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991), Iraq would have no objection, when the need arises, against carrying out inspection or verification operations by the Special Commission and IAEA found necessary by them;

(e) The issue of confidence-building during the implementation of ongoing monitoring and the possible verification of any piece of information could be solved in a constructive and professional manner. Therefore, it should not be an obstacle to the implementation of paragraph 22. Iraq on its part affirms that it will abide scrupulously by all matters pertaining to monitoring as agreed upon between it and the Special Commission and IAEA. The Security Council can, in the case where circumstances obstructing the implementation of ongoing monitoring exist, take measures proportionate to these circumstances;

(f) Being desirous to affirm its constructive position regarding the question of monitoring and in order to shorten the preparatory period for the formal initiation of ongoing monitoring, Iraq, and without prejudice to its position stated in subparagraph (c) above, is ready immediately to present the declarations and the information requested by the Special Commission and IAEA to complete the baseline information of the sites to be subjected to monitoring.

8. The Commission explained that the most expeditious way for Iraq to achieve its desired objective of obtaining from the Security Council its agreement, under paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991), that Iraq was in compliance with

the relevant paragraphs of section C of resolution 687 (1991) was for Iraq to provide immediately the formal acknowledgement of its obligations under resolution 715 (1991) and the plans approved thereunder. The Commission could then immediately initiate full-scale ongoing monitoring and verification with the aim of getting to the stage where the plans are up and running within the briefest possible time. The framework within which the Commission operated required it to proceed in this manner:

(a) Resolutions 687 (1991), 707 (1991) and 715 (1991), in respect of the weapons of mass destruction provisions, constituted an indissoluble whole. Their implementation was not sequential, and the various stages contained in resolutions 687 (1991) and 715 (1991) overlapped;

(b) Resolution 715 (1991) was a mandatory resolution adopted unanimously by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter and was thus automatically binding on Member States from the date of its adoption on 11 October 1991. While there was thus no issue of acceptance, Iraq's formal acknowledgement of its obligations under the resolution and the plans was a precondition for undertaking effective monitoring on the territory of Iraq, in compliance with the requirements of the plans, with clearly defined rights, and the assurance of continuity. Iraq's delay in providing that acknowledgement had effectively blocked the initiation of monitoring since October 1991;

(c) The Commission also pointed out that the Security Council had found that Iraq's prior acknowledgement was one of the essential preconditions to the consideration by the Security Council of lifting sanctions and the embargo under paragraphs 21 and 22 of resolution 687 (1991) (S/23609);

(d) As a subsidiary organ of the Security Council, the Special Commission was bound to operate within the framework established and the views officially expressed by the Council. It could not therefore undertake full-scale initiation of ongoing monitoring and verification without the Council first receiving Iraq's formal acknowledgement of its obligations under resolution 715 (1991), unless the Council directed otherwise.

9. The Commission noted Iraq's offer, stated in paragraph 7 above, to provide declarations prior to its formal acknowledgement of its obligations under resolution 715 (1991) and the plans approved thereunder. While welcoming that gesture, the Commission pointed out that, in order to achieve full legal value and credibility, declarations should be submitted formally under resolution 715 (1991) and the plans. Furthermore, to be fully effective, baseline inspections and monitoring and verification activities have to be carried out under the acknowledged regime established by resolution 715 (1991). The real solution to this problem is for Iraq to provide immediately its formal acknowledgement of resolution 715 (1991).

(b) Implementation of the plan

10. Iraq again raised its concerns in relation to the implementation of the plan for ongoing monitoring and verification, namely, that Iraqi aerial assets should replace those of the Commission, that Iraq's scientific, technical and economic development should not be hindered and that there should be amendment of the methods used to implement the plans over time to bring them in line with

the methods used in international agreements and conventions currently in force. The Commission confirmed its position as summarized in paragraphs 4 and 5 of its July position paper (S/26127), and in annex II, section A, of the September report (S/26451).

(c) Periodic reviews

11. The Commission and Iraq had agreed in principle to undertake periodic reviews of ongoing monitoring and verification, particularly with regard to the issues mentioned in paragraph 10 above. They now agree that a first such review could be held three months after the formal initiation of the plan for monitoring and verification, to be followed regularly, during the initial period of implementation, approximately every third month or at such intervals as they would agree upon.

12. The plan itself may only be revised by the Security Council. The Commission considers that the annexes to the plan should be revised as and when it is necessary, in the light of experience and information gained in the conduct of monitoring and verification. Reviews of the provisions of the plan should, in general, be held in line with such need.

(d) Inspection rights

13. The delegation of Iraq stated that, after the implementation of paragraph 22 of resolution 687 (1991), in addition to the conduct of ongoing monitoring and verification under the Security Council resolutions, the Special Commission and IAEA could undertake, when the need arises, immediate on-site inspections. The Commission welcomed that statement. These inspections would be conducted and any actions taken in accordance with the relevant Security Council resolutions.

II. NUCLEAR ASPECTS

A. Introduction

14. IAEA is confident that the essential elements of Iraq's nuclear weapons programme are understood and have been dismantled. The remaining outstanding issues for compliance with paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) relate to procurement and official acceptance of the ongoing monitoring and verification plan approved by Security Council resolution 715 (1991).

B. Technical compliance

15. Iraq has now provided IAEA with critical information regarding suppliers of prohibited and other materials and sources of technical advice. The information appears to be complete and verifiable. This information will be verified in the course of the next few weeks. With the provision of this information, Iraq has now complied with all disclosure requirements concerning its previous nuclear weapons programme as contained in resolutions 687 (1991) and 707 (1991).

C. Implementation of the ongoing monitoring and verification plan

16. IAEA has phased in elements of its plan over the last 15 months. Iraq is aware of all the elements of this plan including:

- (a) Environmental sampling of air, water and surfaces;
- (b) Inspection of known sites relevant to the past nuclear programme and sites with potential to support a nuclear weapons programme;
- (c) Inspection of new sites which may be identified in the future;
- (d) Control of allowed nuclear materials and dual-use technical equipment;
- (e) Imagery;
- (f) Surveillance equipment/use of sensors.

17. The majority of information needed to implement fully the plan is at hand - both sides are aware of the information still needed to complete the requirements of annex 2 and annex 3 of the IAEA plan.

18. IAEA is satisfied that the plan has so far been implemented properly and will add or subtract elements as conditions require.

D. Statement on compliance

19. With Iraq's formal acceptance of the plans in Security Council resolution 715 (1991), which lays out terms, conditions and IAEA rights under the ongoing monitoring and verification plan, IAEA would be satisfied that Iraq has complied with the conditions set down in paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of section C of resolution 687 (1991) and would accordingly report to the Security Council. Possible additional disclosures or discoveries would be dealt with during the ongoing monitoring and verification phase.

III. CONCLUSION

20. The two sides have decided to have a high-level meeting in mid-November 1993 in New York.

(Signed) Amer Muhammad RASHID
Director, Military Industrialization
Corporation of Iraq

(Signed) Rolf EKEUS
Executive Chairman
Special Commission

(Signed) Maurizio ZIFFERERO
Leader, IAEA Action Team

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Attachment I

Delegation of Iraq

1. H.E. Mr. Tariq Aziz
Deputy Prime Minister
2. General Amer Muhammad Rashid
Director, Military Industrialization Corporation
3. Mr. Saad A. Alfaisal
Senior Under-Secretary
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
4. Mr. Riyadh Al-Qaysi
Under-Secretary
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
5. Mr. Abdul Halim Al-Hijaj
Vice-Chairman
Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission
6. Mr. Bassam Kubaa
Ambassador
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
7. Mr. Hossam Muhammad Amin
Military Industrialization Corporation
8. Mr. Saeed H. Al-Musawi
Minister Plenipotentiary
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
9. Mr. Samir K. Al-Nima
Minister Plenipotentiary
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
10. Mr. Sami Sadoon
Chef de Cabinet of the Deputy Prime Minister

Delegation of the Special Commission and IAEA

Special Commission

IAEA

Ambassador Rolf Ekéus

Professor Maurizio Zifferero

Mr. John F. Scott

Mr. Robert Kelley

Mr. Tim Trevan

Ms. Lydie Gerard

Ms. Olivia Platon

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Attachment II

Letter dated 8 October 1993 from the IAEA Action Team Leader
and the Executive Chairman of the Special Commission
addressed to the Foreign Minister of Iraq

In view of the fact that Iraq has provided the information required by the Special Commission and IAEA on critical foreign suppliers as defined in document S/26451, annex I, the Commission and IAEA hereby declare that they will use the said information solely in order to identify all the elements of Iraq's previous programmes in the proscribed fields, to clarify related technical and scientific issues for the purposes of resolution 687 (1991), and to assist the Commission and IAEA in the planning and conduct of ongoing monitoring and verification. The information will be treated as confidential and will not be published. The Commission and IAEA will, in conformity with their usual practice, require all those having access to the information to respect this confidentiality and to use it solely for the purpose just identified.



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13 October 1993

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NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

At the 3290th meeting of the Security Council, held on 13 October 1993, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item "Navigation on the Danube river in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)", the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:

"The Security Council has learned with deep concern that the blocking of the Danube by two Serbian non-governmental organizations is still continuing and deplores the acquiescence of the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), which is reflected in the fact that they have failed to take any action to prevent these acts. It condemns these deliberate and unjustified acts of interference with the river traffic of several Member States of the United Nations. It emphasizes the importance it attaches to the free and unhindered navigation on the Danube which is essential for legitimate trade in the region. It reminds the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of their previous written commitment to secure free and safe navigation on this vital international waterway.

"The Security Council is also concerned that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) continue to impose tolls on foreign vessels transiting the section of the Danube which passes through the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). By extracting these payments, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) violates its international obligations. The Security Council rejects any attempt to justify, on whatever ground, the imposition of tolls on the Danube. It demands that the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and any others imposing similar tolls cease such action immediately.

"The Security Council condemns these illegal actions and reaffirms that it is wholly unacceptable for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to take retaliatory measures in response to action by a State in fulfilment of its obligations under the Charter of the United Nations. It reminds the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of its own international obligations and demands that its authorities ensure free movement of international traffic on the Danube.

"The Security Council remains seized of the matter."



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S/26573
13 October 1993
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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE QUESTION CONCERNING HAITI

1. The present report is submitted to the Security Council in response to the statement adopted by the Council on 11 October 1993, in which the latter requested me to report urgently to it whether the incidents of 11 October constituted serious and consistent non-compliance by the Armed Forces of Haiti with the Governors Island Agreement.

2. The incidents of 11 October 1993, which prevented the deployment of a contingent of the military component of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) arriving on board the vessel Harlan County, were the culmination of a situation which had been deteriorating in Haiti in recent weeks.

3. The evidence of this deterioration is as follows:

(a) The repeatedly observed lack of will on the part of the command of the Armed Forces of Haiti to facilitate the deployment and operation of UNMIH. Ignorance of the meaning and scope of UNMIH has, in particular, been claimed, in spite of the assent of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Haiti to the explanations provided during the discussions which took place on Governors Island in July 1993 and during the visits to Haiti of various bilateral and United Nations missions to explain the arrangements for United Nations assistance in modernizing Haiti's armed forces and police.

(b) Administrative obstacles created to delay the start of the Mission.

4. This bad will was even more apparent in the incidents which occurred on 11 October 1993. All the necessary commitments had been obtained in writing from the military and port authorities in Port-au-Prince. Nevertheless, the port was blocked and the vessel was unable to dock. The port authorities denied having had any contact with United Nations representatives and left a clear field for the action of armed civilians, who committed countless acts of intimidation, fired into the air, made threats against Haitian and international journalists and committed hostile acts against representatives of the international community. In spite of repeated appeals to the heads of Haiti's armed forces and police, General Cédras and Lieutenant-Colonel Michel François, nothing was done to bring the situation under control.

5. The lack of will to take action against groups of armed civilians who had gained control and were sowing terror in Haiti had already been observed on

numerous occasions, particularly when Antoine Izméry was assassinated on 11 September 1993. The police had at every turn facilitated the actions of the perpetrators of the assassination, as the Civilian Mission in Haiti (MICIVIH) has reported.

6. This was also the case with the serious incidents which occurred near the Hôtel Christopher in Port-au-Prince on 5 October, when offices of the Prime Minister were attacked by armed civilians, with the participation of members of the police force, who allowed acts of vandalism to be carried out. MICIVIH monitors counted approximately 200 armed civilians operating with the police.

7. On Thursday, 7 October, a general strike was declared "against UNMIH" on the proposal of a group known as the Front pour l'avancement et le progrès d'Haiti (FRAPH). On numerous occasions this group has threatened the Prime Minister and members of the cabinet, the representative of the Secretary-General and French and Canadian personnel of UNMIH. During the strike, which was condemned by the Haitian Government and by Haitian society, the city of Port-au-Prince was paralysed by the violent activities of groups of armed civilians, who, among other things, forced merchants to close their stalls. MICIVIH monitors observed that armed civilians and police personnel brandishing automatic weapons or pointing them at passers-by were often seen riding together in vehicles which were criss-crossing the town.

8. Most of the instructions issued by the Government of Haiti to the Haitian armed forces and police have not been carried out, which, in my view, constitutes a clear violation of the principle of the subordination of military forces to civilian authority, which is a central feature of the Governors Island Agreement. The examples given above reflect a lack of will on the part of Haiti's military authorities to "cooperate fully in the peaceful transition to a ... democratic society" in accordance with the Governors Island Agreement. They also reflect the clear and explicit intent to prevent the democratic process, as accepted in that Agreement, from taking its course.

9. Accordingly, in the light of paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 861 (1993), which states that the Security Council "confirms its readiness, as noted in the letter from the President of the Council of 15 July 1993 (S/26085), to terminate immediately the suspension of the measures referred to in paragraph 1 above if, at any time, the Secretary-General, having regard for the views of the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, informs the Security Council that the parties to the Governors Island Agreement or any other authorities in Haiti have not complied in good faith with the Agreement", I must inform the Council that the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Haiti, as one of the parties to the Agreement, and the police chief and commander of the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, as one of the "authorities in Haiti" have failed to fulfil the commitments entered into by General Cédras in his capacity as co-signatory of the Governors Island Agreement.

10. In the light of all the foregoing facts, which reflect serious and consistent non-compliance with the Governors Island Agreement, and having regard to the views of the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States, I consider it necessary, in accordance with resolution 861 (1993), to terminate the suspension of the measures set out in paragraphs 5 to 9 of resolution 841 (1993).



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LETTER DATED 11 OCTOBER 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government and further to my previous letters, the most recent of which was that issued as document S/26550, I have the honour to inform you of an incident that took place on 6 October 1993. Two Iranian officers, a colonel and a captain, alighted from a Land Cruiser vehicle and proceeded to the Iraqi position at coordinates 6526. They told the individuals manning the position that the Iraqi side should pull back the Iraqi position at coordinates 645271, specifying the afternoon of 7 October 1993 as the deadline for compliance.

This proceeding is to be regarded as an act of provocation intended to create pretexts for perpetrating further hostile acts against populated areas and Iraqi border posts.

The Government of the Republic of Iraq, which is wary of the consequences of this action and of its underlying motives, will hold the Iranian side responsible for the perpetration of any new aggression against populated areas and Iraqi border posts.

We request your intervention with a view to preventing the Iranian regime from again engaging in such acts of provocation as constitute a violation of the cease-fire provisions and the terms governing the area of separation between the two countries, and which also heighten tension in the region.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nizar HAMDOON
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Security Council

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13 October 1993
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ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 12 OCTOBER 1993 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES OF
THE PERMANENT MISSION OF AZERBAIJAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to inform you that on 10 October at 0700 hours, after massive shelling, units of the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia, supported by large numbers of armoured vehicles, launched an offensive in the Djibrail district of the Azerbaijani Republic. Attempts were made to capture the villages of Safarja and Gujyak, as well as the strategic heights surrounding them.

Beginning at 1400 hours on 12 October, the offensive was resumed, this time in the direction of the villages of Sheibey, Nuzgyar and Fyrchan. These settlements have already been captured. There has been considerable destruction and many casualties among the civilian population. According to reports, this operation is being carried out under the direct leadership of the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Armenia, S. Sarkisyan.

The Republic of Armenia is so confident that it can act with impunity and without restraint that it continues to commit aggression and to capture new Azerbaijani territory. And this is happening just when the Personal Representative of the Chairman-in-Office of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), M. Mossberg, is in the area of conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan conducting intensive consultations with the aim of revising an "Adjusted timetable of urgent steps to implement Security Council resolutions 822 (1993) and 853 (1993)".

With regard to the Republic of Armenia's never-ending aggression against the Azerbaijani Republic, I request the Security Council to take the strongest measures in order to put a halt to the seizure of new areas and settlements in Azerbaijan.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated immediately as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yashar ALIYEV
Chargé d'affaires

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LETTER DATED 13 OCTOBER 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF GEORGIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On the instruction of my Government, I have the honour to request a meeting of the Security Council in connection with the tragic events which recently happened in Abkhazia, the Republic of Georgia.

I attach herein a copy of the letter of the Chairman of the Parliament, Head of State of the Republic of Georgia, Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze, addressed to H.E. Secretary-General of the United Nations Dr. Boutros Boutros-Ghali in which you will see Mr. Eduard Shevardnadze requests a special meeting of the Security Council.

I would be most grateful if this letter and this attachment are circulated to the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dr. Peter CHKHEIDZE
Permanent Representative,
Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary

Annex

Letter dated 12 October 1993 from the Chairman of
the Parliament and Head of State of the Republic
of Georgia addressed to the Secretary-General

You are aware of the fact that on 16 September 1993 the Gudauta armed groups once more treacherously violated the Sochi cease-fire agreement of 27 July and started a savage massacre of the civilian population.

To justify the renewal of bloodshed fifty days after the conclusion of the agreement, the Gudauta fascists of the nineties of the twentieth century claim that the Georgian side was purposefully dragging out the fulfilment of the terms of the agreement, allegedly violating the schedule of the withdrawal of the troops, artillery and heavy armour. The resumption of the military operations has disclosed the true violators of the agreement - the Gudauta side has turned out to be well-prepared to wage a war, being equipped with state-of-the-art weapons, currently at the disposal of the Russian military forces.

At the Joint Commission meetings the Georgian representatives have repeatedly stated that it is the Gudauta side which avoids compliance with the terms of the above agreement. Previously, they had hidden away a considerable amount of artillery and heavy armour and were biding their time to unleash active offensives. The subsequent unfolding of events testified to the above.

Dear Secretary-General, we attempted to avoid this catastrophe with all the means within our power. With a feeling of gratitude, I want to acknowledge all of your personal efforts to bring the Abkhaz conflict to an end. One group of United Nations observers had arrived at the war zone and started their work, but even that wasn't sufficient to impede the dastardly schemes of the separatists. Gudauta barbarians and their supporters conducted ethnic cleansing and genocide of ethnic Georgians of the Abkhaz region. They showed mercy to no one, neither to child or woman, nor to the elderly. Instead, they shot to death everyone that fell into their hands. Zhiuli Shartava, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Abkhazia, became one of the victims of their cruelty.

As a result of a violation of the 27 July Sochi Agreement, about 3,000 were wounded and hundreds of innocent people perished. One cannot estimate the entire number of victims because, following the retreat from Sukhumi, it became impossible to register the dead or wounded. However, according to numerous eye witness accounts, the extermination of ethnic Georgians still continues. Over 125,000 displaced persons fled the Abkhaz region and are dying of hunger and cold in the Svaneti mountains.

Regretfully, I need to mention that the United Nations Security Council has not yet presented its evaluation of these tragic events that have befallen Georgia.

Dear Secretary-General, the Georgian Republic urgently requests that a special United Nations Security Council meeting be convoked. We believe that the facts about ethnic cleansing and genocide of peaceful population in Abkhazia require a severe condemnation by the United Nations Security Council. If we

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take into consideration multiple statements by Abkhaz separatists, we need to acknowledge that there is a serious threat placed upon the territorial integrity of the Georgian Republic.

We are certain that the United Nations Security Council will fully use all its authority to coerce Abkhaz leaders to cease their abominable violations of human dignity and the heartless slaughter of these persecuted ethnic Georgians. Simultaneously, we hope that the Security Council will instruct all United Nations members to desist in their support of Abkhaz separatists until this issue is politically resolved.

We ask you to immediately take all necessary measures to organize a special working mission under the aegis of the United Nations which will collect data concerning the barbaric violations of human rights. In the near future this information will form a cornerstone in the formulation of the proper charges against separatists by the international community.

I will take this opportunity to once again show you my deep and honest respect.

(Signed) Eduard SHEVARDNADZE



Security Council

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LETTER DATED 13 OCTOBER 1993 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF AZERBAIJAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to inform you that the Armenian army has renewed vigorous military action in the south-west of Azerbaijan in violation of the cease-fire agreements.

Yesterday, 12 October 1993, after intensive artillery preparation, units of the Armenian armed forces, launching an attack to the south, captured a further four inhabited localities - Sheibeili, Chafan, Safarsha and Nusgar - in the Djebrail region of Azerbaijan.

The military action is being conducted in immediate proximity to the Azerbaijan-Iran frontier. According to information that has been received, the territory of the Islamic Republic of Iran is also coming under artillery fire.

The attack by the armed Armenian formations caused panic among the population and led to new flows of refugees.

On the same day, 12 October, the defensive positions of the Azerbaijan army in the Geranboy region of Azerbaijan also came under intensive fire.

In connection with the unceasing aggression of Armenia against Azerbaijan and the escalation of military action in immediate proximity to the Azerbaijan-Iran frontier, which may have extremely serious consequences, I request the Security Council, on instructions from my Government, to take the most effective measures to halt the further capture of new territories and inhabited localities in Azerbaijan.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated forthwith as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Yashar ALIYEV
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
